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CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS
by
Robert W. Hamilton*

T

he practice of corporate law has become increasingly a matter of
taxation and securities regulation, both Texas and federal. The statute
that undoubtedly has the greatest day-to-day impact on an attorney's corporate practice is the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Code was massively
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 19761 which significantly changed many
of the basic ground rules of business law practice. For example, the deductibility of losses arising from most so-called "tax shelters" are limited to the
amount the taxpayer had at risk. 2 As a result, the widespread use of nonrecourse loans has come to a screeching halt. The holding period for long
term capital gains was increased to nine months for 1977 and to twelve
months thereafter.3 The minimum tax on tax preferences was increased
from ten percent to fifteen percent and new tax preference items were
added. 4 The special tax treatment for qualified stock options as a compensation device was abolished for options created after May 20, 1976, and the
complex interplay of tax concepts applicable to the exercise of qualified
options acquired before that date reduce their attractiveness even further.5
Future compensation devices for corporate executives will therefore take
new forms. 6 The Tax Reform Act made so many changes that it is important
to look at the Code for the possibility of amendment whenever new taxrelated issues arise.
I.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The 1977 session of the Texas Legislature made a number of changes in
applicable statutory provisions relating to corporations and partnerships.
While none of the changes can be classified as major, they are quite numer©Copyright 1978, by Robert W. Hamilton.
B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., University of Chicago. Vinson and Elkins Professor
of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
2. I.R.C. § 465. These "tax shelters" include certain farming equipment leasing, motion
picture, video tape, and oil and gas well activities.
3. Id. § 1222.
4. Id. §§ 56(a), 57(a).
5. See Moffitt, Executives Make Some Mistakes in Exercise of Stock Options; Extra Taxes
May Result, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 34, col. 1. This article points out that in some
circumstances a corporate executive may be better off treating the entire gainas ordinary

income-compensation for personal services.
6. Such devices may include restricted stock plans pursuant to which the corporation
transfers stock to an employee subject to restrictions that affect its value. The excess of the fair
market value over cost is taxed to the employee when the stock is no longer subject to the
restriction, but the employee may elect to have the value of the restricted stock taxed to him in
the year in which it is received. I.R.C. § 83. In the latter event, however, no deduction is
allowed if the property is later forfeited. Another device is stock appreciation rights (SARs)
which give employees the advantages of a stock option without actually requiring a purchase or
holding of the stock. SARs are exempted from § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1977).
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ous. Both the Texas Securities Board and the Securities and Exchange
Commission also made significant regulatory changes during the survey
period.
A.

Assumed Names

Chapter 36 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code7 is a comprehensive set of statutory provisions relating to the use of assumed business or
professional names, replacing the somewhat ambiguous and skeletal provi-

sions of prior law. The Act requires that a person conducting business under
an assumed name must file a certificate with the county clerk in each county
in which such person has or will maintain business or professional premises. 8 In addition, a foreign or domestic corporation conducting business
under an assumed name must file a certificate with the secretary of state and
with the county clerk in the county in which its registered or principal
business office is located. 9 A major innovation of chapter 36 is a set of

carefully drafted definitions, including in particular a definition of "assumed name"' 0 that materially assists in determining whether the filing of a
certificate is required."

The required contents of the certificate for individuals, partnerships,
estates, real estate investment trusts, companies, and corporations are all
carefully spelled out in the statute. 2 The secretary of state is authorized to
promulgate permissive forms relating to assumed names 3 and has done so
for corporations.
Each certificate is effective for a period of ten years, unless a shorter

period is designated,' 4 and a new certificate must be filed if events occur that
7. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.26 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Chapter 36 may be
cited as the "Assumed Business or Professional Name Act."
8. Id. § 36.10.
9. Id. § 36.11.
10. Id. § 36.02(7) provides:

'Assumed name' means:

in the case of an individual, a name that does not include the surname of the
individual;
(B) in the case of a joint venture or general partnership, a name that does not
include the surname or other legal name of each joint venturer or general
partner;
(C) in the case of an individual, joint venture, or a general partnership, a name,
including a surname, that suggests the existence of additional owners by
including words such as 'Company,' '& Company,' '& Son,' '& Sons,' '&
Associates,' 'Brothers,' and the like, but not words that merely describe the
business or professional service being conducted or rendered;
(D) in the case of a limited partnership, any name other than the name stated in
its certificate of limited partnership;
(E) in the case of a company, any name used by the company; and
(F) in the case of a corporation, any name other than the name stated in its
articles of incorporation or association or comparable document.
I1. Id. § 36.11(c) specifically resolves a question on which there was some uncertainty
under prior law:
Nothing in this chapter shall require a corporation or its shareholders, associates,
or members to file an assumed business or professional name certificate in order
to conduct business or render a professional service within this state under the
name of the corporation as stated in its articles of incorporation, association, or
comparable document.
(A)

12.

See

19

R.

HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

13. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN, § 36.16 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
14. Id. § 36.13(a).

§§

70-72 (1973).
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make the filing "materially misleading."' 5 The most common events that
require the filing of a new certificate are specified. 16 Failure to file a
certificate when one is required will close the courts of the state to the
person until the proper certificate is filed; 7 further, conducting business or
rendering a professional service under an assumed name that violates a
provision of chapter 36 constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
to exceed $2,000.18
A transition period for replacing outstanding assumed name certificates

with certificates complying with chapter 36 expires December 31, 1978.
Each county clerk is directed to notify all persons having outstanding
assumed name certificates of the new requirements. 9 Both county clerks
and the secretary of state are directed to maintain alphabetical lists of all
assumed names filed in their respective offices." The filing fees are established by statute as $2.00 for filing in county clerks' offices and $10.00 for
filing in the secretary of state's office.
B.

Foreign Limited Partnerships

The status of foreign limited partnerships doing business in Texas was
uncertain under prior law. Cautious attorneys recommended that a limited
partnership created under the laws of some other state file a certificate in the

office of the secretary of state if it planned to transact business in Texas and
wished to insure that its limited partners would not become liable on obligations arising from its activities in Texas.
2
The new section 32 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act '

provides for the qualification of a foreign limited partnership to transact
business in Texas in a manner similar to that applicable to foreign corporations. In order to qualify, a foreign limited partnership must file a qualification statement, its certificate of limited partnership (or equivalent document) together with all amendments, and must pay a filing fee based on the
capitalization of the limited partnership identical to the filing fee applicable
to a domestic limited partnership. 22 Upon qualification a foreign limited
15. Id. § 36.12.
16. Id. § 36.12(b) provides:
An event that causes the information contained in a certificate filed under this
chapter to become materially misleading includes such matters as:
(I) a change in the name, identity, entity, form of business or professional
organization, or location of a registrant;
(2) in the case of a proprietorship or sole practitioner, a change in ownership;
(3) in the case of a partnership, the admission of a new partner or joint venturer
or whenever any general partner or joint venturer ceases to be associated
with the partnership; or
(4) in the case of a registrant that is required by law to maintain a registered or
similar office and a registered or similar agent at such office, a change in the
address of such office or identity of such agent.
17. Id. § 36.25. The last sentence of this section adds: "In an action or proceeding brought
against a person that has not complied with this chapter, the plaintiff or other party bringing the
suit or proceeding may recover, if the court shall so determine, expenses incurred, including
attorney's fees, in locating and effecting service of process on such person."
18. Id. § 36.26.
19. Id. 88 36.13(d), (e).
20. Id. § 36.15.
21. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 32 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
22. Id. 88 32(b)(3), (d). The computation of this fee is discussed in 19 R. HAMILTON, supra
note 12, § 212.
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partnership enjoys the same rights and privileges, and is subject to the same
duties, restrictions, and liabilities as a domestic limited partnership. 23 A
qualified foreign limited partnership must maintain a registered agent and
registered office in Texas; the limited partnership, and at least one general
partner, must consent to service of process in Texas for the enforcement of
obligations of the limited partnership. 24 The secretary of state has prepared
forms for qualification of foreign limited partnerships under section 32.25
C. Incorporationof a Going Business
Article 1302-2.02A of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act
provides that if a "banking, mercantile or other business firm" incorporates
without "a change of firm name" notice must be published, and if this
notice is not published, "no change shall take place in the liability of such
firm or the members thereof." '26 The scope of this provision has been
extensively litigated. 27 A major issue in much of the litigation has been
whether a plaintiff could take advantage of this provision even though he
had actual knowledge of the incorporation. This issue was finally resolved
by legislation in 1977 which added the following sentence to article 13022.02: "It shall be a defense that a claimant had actual notice or knowledge of
28
such incorporation.
Article 1302-2.02A was involved in one case that arose during the survey
period. In Stein v. Hooker Industries, Inc. 29 the individual had transacted
business with the plaintiff under the name "Speed & Sport Warehouse";
thereafter the business was incorporated under the name "Speed & Sport
Warehouse, Inc." Holding that under such circumstances the defendant had
the burden of proof to show actual knowledge, the court concluded that the
mere fact that some of the checks used after incorporation had been imprinted "Speed & Sport Warehouse, Inc." did not give notice of such incorporation. The court, after reviewing the prior case law under Article 1302-2.02,
suggested that earlier cases were distinguishable because "we . . .have a
situation before us where there were previous dealings between the seller
and buyer." 31 Justice Cadena concurred, but he added that he would affirm
"without suggesting that article 1302-2.02 applies only where the creditor
has previously . . . extended credit to" 3 1 the debtor. The question involved
in this case will, of course, continue to arise under the recent amendment.
D. Failure to Pay Franchise Taxes
Article 12.14 of the General Taxation Statutes 32 provides a powerful
incentive to keep the payment of franchise taxes current. The article creates
personal liability in certain corporate officers or directors for corporate
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 32(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
Id. §§ 32(b)(2)(C), (j).
See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 221.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02A (Vernon 1962).
27. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 235.
23.
24.
25.
26.

28. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

29.
30.
31.
32.

545 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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obligations created after the right to do business is forfeited for non-payment of franchise taxes. This statute has also given rise to considerable
litigation in the past. 33 In 1977 the statute was divided into three numbered
paragraphs and the last paragraph was revised to read:
(3) Each director and officer of any corporation whose right to do
business within this State shall be so forfeited shall, as to any and all
debts of such corporation, which shall include all franchise-taxes and
penalties thereon which shall become due and payable subsequent to
the date of such forfeiture, and which may be created or incurredwithin
this State, after the report or payment becomes due and before the
revival of the right of such corporation to do business, be deemed and
held liable thereon in the same manner and to the same extent as if such
directors and officers of such corporation were partners. However, any
officer or director may avoid liability if he shows that the debt was
created (1) over his objection, or (2) without his knowledge, if the
exercise of reasonable diligence to acquaint himself with the affairs of
the corporation would not have revealed the intention to create the
debt.34
This provision differs from prior law in two basic respects:
(1) Formerly, personal liability existed only with respect to debts
created with the officer's or director's "knowledge, approval and consent";
the revised article 12.14 imposes liability unless the officer or director can
show affirmatively that the debt was created over his objection or without
his knowledge "if the exercise of reasonable diligence to acquaint himself
with the affairs of the corporation would not have revealed the intention to
create the debt."35 In other words the burden is no longer on the creditor to
show knowledge of the officer or director to disprove knowledge or the
possibility of knowledge. In addition the standard for finding non-liability
appears to have been narrowed.
(2) Personal liability exists with respect to all debts incurred after the
report or payment becomes due, assuming that the corporation's right to do
business is thereafter forfeited; under prior law personal liability existed
only with respect to debts created after the right to do business is forfeited.
An internal memorandum of the comptroller of public accounts describes
this effect as follows:
That is, if the annual report, which is due June 15, is not filed and the
corporation's right to do business is forfeited on September 15, the
officer's personal liability is for debts created after June 15. Previously
the risk of personal liability is for debts created after September 15. 3
E. Information Collected by -the Comptroller
Beginning in 1977, and once each year thereafter, each corporation must
submit to the comptroller of public accounts a list containing the following:
the name, title, and mailing address of each director and officer; the name of
each corporation in which the corporation filing the report owns a ten
33.

See 19 R.

34.

TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).

HAMILTON,

supra note 12, § 235.

35. Id.
36. Interoffice Memorandum to Accounts Examiners from Eleanor Braun, Aug. 25, 1977,
Comptroller of Public Accounts.
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percent or greater interest; and the name of each corporation which owns a
ten percent or greater interest in the corporation filing the report.37 These
reports are forwarded to the secretary of state and are available for public
inspection. 38 The comptroller has prepared a mandatory form for complying
with these requirements which, for the first time, may provide reasonably
up-to-date information about current participants in corporations.
The administration of the ten percent requirement, however, may prove
troublesome. It is unclear, for example, whether indirect ownership is to be
counted toward the ten percent requirement, or whether only pure record
ownership need be taken into account. These questions presumably will
initially be resolved by each corporation since the comptroller has given no
guidance on such matters in the mandatory form.
F. Amendments to the Texas Securities Act
Section 33 of the Texas Securities Act, the basic civil liability section of
that Act, was completely rewritten and greatly expanded in 1977. 39 Liability
was extended to buyers who purchase on the basis of materially false or
incomplete representations, to issuers which register securities for secondary distribution, and to control persons and aiders of securities act violations. Further, the requirements of an offer to rescind in the variety of
circumstances now covered by the section are clearly spelled out. The
statute of limitations was also rewritten to reflect the complexities of the
expanded statute, although the basic three-year statute was retained.4 ° The
revisions of section 33 bring the Texas statute much closer to federal law,
particularly rule lOb-5. 41In light of the recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court narrowing the scope of that rule, 42 this section of the Texas
Securities Act is likely to assume greater importance in the future.
The legislature also enacted a number of technical amendments prepared
by the Texas Securities Board. 43 These included a uniform fee schedule for
licenses instead of the prior complex and confusing system. 44 The new
schedule makes clear that the fee for registering securities is computed only
on the aggregate amount of securities proposed to be sold in Texas and to
investors located in this state.
G. Sunset Act
45
The State Securities Board was made subject to the Texas Sunset Act,
37. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.12 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
38. White, Changes in Filings for Secretary of State, 40 TEX. B.J. 845 (1977). The comptroller currently maintains a microfilm record of such written submissions. The secretary of state
will supply the information so developed upon written request and payment of a $2.00 handling
fee. Telephone requests cannot be handled.
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

40. See Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1977).
42. These cases include Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
43. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
44. Id. art. 581-35.
45. Id. art. 581-2(f).
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and is scheduled for review under that Act before September 1, 1983. Unless
continued by the legislature it will be abolished on that date. The secretary
of state is a constitutional office and is treated differently. It will be reviewed at the time agencies scheduled for abolishment on 6September 1,
1989, are reviewed, but, is not itself subject to abolishment.
H. Penaltiesfor Corporate Criminal Conduct
The legislature also made adjustments to the schedule of fines applicable
to corporations convicted of criminal conduct carrying potential sentences
of imprisonment for individuals. Such fines were increased to $20,000 for a
felony, $10,000 for a class A or class B misdemeanor, and $2,000 for a class
C misdemeanor. A further provision was added authorizing a fine equal to
twice the personal injury, property damage, or other loss caused through
criminal conduct constituting a felony or class A or class B misdemeanor.
any person the court
Finally, a corporation may be compelled to notify
47
deems appropriate of the fact of such conviction.
I. Tender Offers
A number of states have adopted statutes regulating tender offers.4 1 Such
legislation was proposed for Texas, but it was withdrawn when the Texas
Securities Board adopted regulations that contained analogous provisions.
The regulations are described as "administrative guidelines for minimum
standards in tender offers" and provide that offers not meeting the standards will be looked on "with disfavor." 49 An intention to make a tender
offer must be disclosed to the Securities Commissioner at least twenty-one
days prior to the offer, and the offer itself must remain open for twenty-one
days. Other provisions require full disclosure, pro rata acceptances when
less than all tenders are accepted, and0 retroactive effect of increases in price
to cover shares tendered previously.5
Federal law, however, will continue to affect the tender offer area significantly. A district court in Texas has held invalid the Idaho tender offer
statute on the ground that the subject is preempted by federal legislationthe Williams Act.5' The SEC is considering regulatory action that would
revise its regulations under the Williams Act. 52 Tender offers for shares of
large corporations (sales of $10,000,000 or more if a manufacturing corporation, or assets of $10,000,000 or more if not) may be subject to a fifteen-day
waiting period, for review by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, if the offeror meets certain size
requirements.5 3 Finally, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. , a case
46. Id. art. 4330a.
47. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Prior to 1977 the schedule of fines
was $10,000, $2,000, and $200, respectively, and a fine based on the size of the transaction was
limited to twice the amount of money or property gained from the transaction.

48. See generally Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Tex. Sec. Bd. Reg. 065.15.00.100(b).
Id. 065.15.00.400(a), (c), (d), (f), (g).
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
430 U.S. 1 (1977). For a discussion of the persons who may have standing, consult
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having considerable significance for the doctrine of implied causes of action
and the development of federal securities law generally, the United States
Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful contender for control of a target
company does not have standing to sue for damages under the Williams Act.
J. Securities Regulation
The SEC has under active review the entire question of shareholder
participation in large public corporations." As part of that review it made
significant changes in its shareholder proposal regulation, 6 while calling for
further study of the entire area. The current rules relating to shareholder
proposals can be briefly summarized:
(1) The proposal must be timely submitted, which in the case of an
annual meeting must be not less than ninety days in advance of a date
corresponding to the date set forth on management's proxy statement in the
previous year;
(2) The proposal may be omitted if:
(a) it is not a proper subject for action by security holders, under the
law of the issuer's domicile;
(b) it would require the issuer to violate any state, federal, or foreign
law if implemented;
(c) it is contrary to any of the SEC's proxy regulations;
(d) it relates to the enforcement of a personal claim or the redress of a
personal grievance, against the issuer, its management, or any person;
(e) it deals with a matter that is not significantly related to the issuer's
business;
(f) it deals with a matter that is beyond the issuer's power to effectuate;
(g) it deals with a matter relating to the ordinary business operations
of the issuer;
(h) it relates to specific amounts of dividends;
(i) the proposal is moot;
(j) the proposal is either counter to a proposal by management or
substantially the same as a proposal by another shareholder which will be
included in the proxy materials; or
(k) substantially the same proposal has previously been submitted to
the shareholders within the previous five years and failed to receive
specified percentages of the vote, depending on the number of times it was
submitted previously;
(3) A proponent may submit a maximum of two proposals not exceeding
an aggregate of 300 words; and
(4) The accompanying statement for each proposal may not be more
than 200 words."
Aranow, Berlstein & Einhorn, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams Act, 32
Bus. LAW 1755 (1977).
55. Hearings on shareholder communications, participation in corporate elections, and
corporate governance were held by the SEC in September and October 1977. SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 422, at A-3.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1976).
57. Id.
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In 1976 the SEC also significantly relaxed the requirements for registering
restricted or letter stock. Where the corporation has registered a class of
securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and is complying with
the continuous disclosure requirements of that Art, registration on form
S-16 is permitted. 58 Typically this completed form runs only three or four
pages and incorporates by reference most financial information. The cost of
preparing such a registration statement is only a small fraction of a full-scale
registration.
II.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Partnership
Interesting and challenging partnership cases continue to arise in Texas.
Three cases during the survey period involve the question of whether, under
the particular circumstances, a partnership was formed.59 These cases reveal
that misconceptions continue on the part of some Texas appellate judges as
to the legal test for the existence of the partnership relationship. Section 6 of
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act' provides that a partnership "is an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." Further, section 7(4) provides the "receipt by a person of a share of
the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the
business, but no such inference shall be drawn" if the profits were to be
received as repayment of a debt, or as wages, rent, interest, or other
relationship.6 There is no reference to a sharing of losses as an essential
element of the partnership relation, although a sharing of losses is a consequence of the partnership relation since section 18(l)(a) provides that "subject to any agreement between them. . . each partner. . must contribute
towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share of the profits." Under section 18 the partners
can, by agreement, allocate the losses differently from the profits without
affecting the existence of the partnership relation.6 2 For example, all the
losses may be allocated to partner B while the profits are shared equally
63
between partners B and C.
The one case that seems most clearly to misapply these principles is TexCo Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc. 64 In this case several ranchers
entered into a written "joint venture" agreement with a feedlot by which the
58. Id. § 239.27 (1977).
59. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 SW.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Tex-Co Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976, no writ); Howard Gault & Son v. First Nat'l Bank, 541 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1976, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6 (Vernon 1970).
61. Id. § 7(4). A sharing of gross returns does not give rise to an inference that a
partnership exists. Id. § 7(3).
62. Id. § 18()(a).
63. Section 15 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act provides that all partners are jointly
and severally liable for all partnership obligations. Section 15 is not qualified by "subject to any
agreement between them" as is § 18. As a result, in the above hypothetical, partner B is fully
liable for partnership obligations but may claim reimbursement from the partnership if it is
solvent. In the event the partnership is insolvent he can compel A to reimburse him, if A is
solvent. If A is insolvent B will have to bear all losses despite his agreement.
64. 542 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Giv. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
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feedlot would accept, feed, and maintain the ranchers' cattle. After the
cattle were sold, the profits would be shared; if the expenses exceeded the
selling price, the feedlot would bear the loss. The court treated the issue as
to whether a partnership existed as an "issue of fact" and concluded that
the "prima facie evidence" of section 7 was negated because there was "no
mutual control over the affairs of the Feedlot or the affairs of the defendants. No tangible property was owned in common. Losses and expenses
were not shared by the defendants., 65 Thus, even though the relationship
admittedly did not fall within any of the exempted categories of section 7, no
partnership was created; the court did not describe what the relationship
was.
Taylor v. Lewis66 involved an agreement by Taylor to manage a new motel
for a stated salary, and an agreement that when there were profits, Taylor
"was to receive ten percent of the profits to be applied toward the purchase
of a ten percent interest in the motel as determined by the cost of the land
and the construction.1 67 During and after construction, Taylor actively
participated in furnishing the motel; he was listed as an "owner" on a liquor
license application, an assumed name certificate, the partnership tax return
for 1972 (but not for 1973), and similar documents; he was publicly referred
to on a few occasions as a "partner"; and he executed a note on behalf of
the partnership. Things, however, did not work out as contemplated: the
.motel was not profitable and Taylor was ultimately fired without his ever
having paid ten percent of the construction cost or receiving in any formal
way an interest in the partnership or in the motel. Further, there was an
appreciable amount of conflicting evidence that Taylor was not considered
to be a partner, and that the partnership indicia described by Taylor had not
been approved by all the other partners.
The partnership issue was submitted to a jury with the following instruction:
By the term 'partnership' is meant a relationship between two or
more persons where there is a common enterprise and a community of
interest as co-owners therein, a prosecution of the common enterprise
for the joint benefit of the parties, and a right of each of the parties to
participate to some extent in the profits as such and an obligation of
each of the parties
to bear some portion of the losses, if any, sustained
68
in the business.
During its deliberations the jury asked for an expansion of the meaning of
"co-owners"; the court declined, specifically refusing Taylor's oral 69 request that the jury be told that the term "was not limited to those who
contributed property but included those who became co-owners by reason
of contribution of services." 70
In another questionable part of the opinion the court of civil appeals held
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
waiver

Id. at 937.
553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 158.
The court alternatively held that failure to put the request in writing constituted a
under rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 159.

70. Id. at 158.
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that even though the trial judge should have given the jury further direction,
the failure to do so was not reversible error, since the term co-owners had a
commonly understood meaning of joint owners or owners together. The
court added that "the term needs no definition for the juror of average
intelligence, who would be presumed to construe the use of the word in its
usual and ordinary sense.""' While this conclusion appears reasonable on its
face, it appears that the jurors, or at least some of them, thought that coownership required a financial investment in the motel itself, and concluded
that a partnership did not exist because Taylor had never made the required
investment. In any event, after finding that the refusal to give further
instructions did not constitute reversible error, the court concluded that the
jury verdict that no partnership existed was not against the great weight of
the evidence.
The final case, HowardGault & Son v. FirstNational Bank,72 involved all
the question of whether a bank was liable for honoring a check payable to
"Thomas & Gault" on the endorsement:
"Thomas & Gault"
"T.B. Thomas, Jr."
The basic issue was whether Thomas was a partner with the corporate
plaintiff, Howard Gault and Son, Inc. The plaintiff owned or leased certain
farmland. Thomas agreed to farm this land on the following terms: plaintiff
was to receive a crop rental, and extend financing including a monthly
"draw" for Thomas chargeable against Thomas' distributive share; Thomas
was to furnish his own equipment and personal labor; all other expenses
were to be divided equally and the net revenues, rents, and proceeds were to
be divided equally. The written agreement specifically stated the parties
were not partners but were landlord and tenant.
The court quite correctly concluded that the mere statement that a landlord-tenant relation existed was not conclusive, since "[i]t
is the intent to do
the things that constitute a partnership that determines the relationship...
and if [the parties] intend to do a thing which in law constitutes a partnership, they are partners whether their expressed purpose was to create or
avoid the relationship. ,73 On considering the evidence the court ruled that
"as a matter of law, their farming operation was a partnership." 74
Each of these cases recognized that sections 6 and 7 of the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act controlled the central issue. There was sharp disagreement,
however, as to whether the issue is for the court or for the jury, and
apparent disagreement as to the proper test. The conclusions, however,
seem result oriented, and based on the equities of the particular case; Happy
Wheat Growers involved an attempt to hold "secret" partners liable on a
debt that had been created on the belief that the feedlot was solely liable,
while the Hereford First National Bank reasonably assumed that a check to
Thomas & Gault was a check made payable to a partnership and that either
partner might endorse it.
71. Id. at 159.
72. 541 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
73. Id. at 237.
74. Id.
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Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Filip75 is one of the few partnership-by-estoppel
cases to arise in recent years under section 16(1) of the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act. 7 6 An employee of the alleged partnership filled out a credit

application to Cox Enterprises for newspaper advertising which listed Elliott
as an owner along with Filip, an admitted owner. The employee testified that
Elliott knew he was listed on the credit application, but Elliott testified that
he did not authorize his name to be included. The district court believed
Elliott and ruled that he did not consent to being held out as a partner. The
court of civil appeals found that his conclusion was not against the great
weight of the evidence.
The district court also found that Elliott failed to exercise ordinary care to
discover whether he had been held out as a partner, but refused to give
judgment against him on this ground. The court of civil appeals agreed,
holding that there is no affirmative duty under section 16(1) of the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act to seek out all those who may represent to others
that he is a partner.77 Section 16(1) speaks not to due care but to knowledge
and consent, and Cox failed to prove that Elliott consented to being held out
as a partner. Such cases essentially turn on their facts, however, and can go
either way, depending upon whether the alleged partner knew that he was
being held out as a partner and whether he consented. The basic lesson is
that there is real risk for persons who allow themselves to be held out as
partners by listing on a letterhead, by being introduced as partners, by
signing a credit application as a joint owner, or by other means. Such
persons may be held liable as a partner even though they do not have the
traditional partnership and profit sharing intent.
Section 21 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act imposes a fiduciary duty
upon partners in their dealings with each other.78 This broad duty, which has
been described as one of the "highest recognized in the law," ' 79 extends to
all aspects of their dealings, even when there has been a significant fallingout between them.80 In appropriate cases, exemplary damages may be im75. 538 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
76. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 16(l) (Vernon 1971) provides:
(1) When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents
himself, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in an
existing partnership or with one or more persons not actually partners, he is liable
to any such person to whom such representation has been made, who has, on the
faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership,
and if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public
manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not been
made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with the knowledge
of the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its being made:
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he were an
actual member of the partnership;
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the other
persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as to incur
liability, otherwise separately.
77. 538 S.W.2d at 838.
78. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21(l) (Vernon 1970) provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
79. Huffington v.Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1976).
80. See, e.g., Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938).
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posed on a partner who breaches this duty. 8
In Kunz v. Huddleston8 2 the parties entered into a verbal partnership
agreement to construct and manage some small drive-in shopping centers.
Huddleston agreed to find the locations, tenants, and financing while Kunz
agreed to construct the centers through his eighty-five percent-owned
construction company. Subsequently a written agreement was entered into
which provided that neither party would receive any salary or compensation
for services during the acquisition, financing, construction, and leasing of
the stores. Despite this provision Kunz, through his construction company,
submitted bills for work which reflected a profit to the construction
company. Huddleston objected and refused to pay; the construction
company then filed a lien on the property, which resulted in the loss of a
loan commitment. At this point the construction company attempted to
foreclose the lien and suit was brought to dissolve the partnership and obtain
an accounting. Reaffirming the broad fiduciary duties described above, the
court held that Kunz was responsible for his construction company's activities because there was a principal/agent relationship, and that Kunz
violated his fiduciary duty which constituted a fraud on Huddleston. Basic
findings of fact to support these conclusions had been made by a jury.
Finally, the court held that, as the guilty party, Kunz was not entitled to
attorneys' fees for seeking to enforce his claim for payment of construction
costs, and that Huddleston, who might have claimed his fees from the
83
partnership under section 18(l)(b) of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act,
was not entitled to do so because he had failed to submit a claim for them.
Johnson v. Buck8 involved even more egregious misconduct by one
partner toward another. The jury found, and the appellate court agreed after
a careful review of the facts, that a managing partner had made significant
misrepresentations and concealed material facts to induce a copartner to sell
his interest in partnership properties. It was no defense that the managing
partner offered to sell his interest at the same price because the managing
partner knew that the selling partner was in financial difficulties and did not
have the resources to purchase the managing partner's interest. Indeed, this
offer gave the misrepresentations and concealment greater force than they
would otherwise have had. A judgment for more than six million dollars was
affirmed.
The final partnership case during the survey period involved essentially a
question of pleading. In Ingram v. Card Co. 85 suit was brought against
"William R. Ingram and S.L. Hutcheson d/b/a Hutcheson and Ingram Development Company." The only answer filed was by "William R. Ingram
d/b/a Hutcheson-Ingram Development Company." Thereafter an interlocu81. See, e.g., Morgan v. Arnold, 441 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
82. 546 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(l)(b) (Vernon 1970) provides: "The
partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities
reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business or for the
preservation of its business or property."
84. 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. 540 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
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tory default judgment was entered against "Hutcheson and Ingram Development Company, a partnership" which subsequently became final. On
appeal the court held that Ingram's answer was an answer for the partnership rather than an answer by himself individually. While the result seems
reasonable under the circumstances, the case highlights the importance of
recognizing that for many purposes a partnership should be treated as an
entity distinct from the partners, and that pleading on behalf of a partnership
should be phrased so as to cover the partnership as well as the partner
actually signing the pleading.
B. Corporations and Securities Regulation
The Recognition of Separate CorporateExistence. Cases involving the
amorphous doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" continue to arise. They
have been a feature of every Annual Survey article since this journal
commenced this series.8 6 Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Construction
Co. 87 is a well reasoned case refusing to hold a parent corporation liable on a
contract entered into by a subsidiary, which was wholly owned and totally
controlled by the parent. Recognizing that a more stringent standard was
applicable in contract cases than in tort cases, the Dallas court of civil
appeals concluded that the following facts were not sufficient to make the
parent liable for the subsidiary's default:
(a) The negotiations were conducted by an officer of the subsidiary who
identified himself as being with the "Hanson Companies";
(b) The officer furnished Dal-Mac's representative with copies of Topics, a publication of the Hanson Companies devoted to potential shopping
center tenants;
(c) This publication listed centers as being operated by "Hanson
Companies" regardless of which of several related corporations actually
owned the center;
(d) Dal-Mac's representative unsuccessfully sought to obtain a credit
report on the subsidiary. Fearing that the subsidiary might be a "shell," he
requested that performance of the contract be guaranteed by the Hanson
brothers personally or by the parent corporation. After the contract was
entered into, he was told that the Hanson brothers would not make a
personal guarantee but that a "financial assurance" was in the mail. The
court concluded that a financial assurance was not tantamount to a promise
to guarantee performance since a third party loan commitment might also
constitute such an assurance, and that even if false it had not been a
motivating factor in entering into the contract.
The court's general discussion of the piercing the corporate veil area
reflects an unusually clear understanding of the nature of the issues involved
in that area and deserves quotation at length:
There must be some ground in addition to mere unity of financial
interest, ownership, and control for a court to treat them as one in law
86. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § -234; Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEXAS
L. REV. 979 (1971).
87. 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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and make each responsible for the torts and contracts of the other. That
additional ground turns on whether there was good faith and honesty in
the use of a subsidiary corporate entity for legitimate ends. Generally, it
is determined by whether the subsidiary corporate entity is so controlled and manipulated by the parent for the parent's own interests that
it prejudices innocent third parties or is in contravention of the public
welfare . . . . The general rule is that courts will not disregard separate
legal entities because of identity of ownership, directors and officers
unless the purpose of the relationship is to defeat public convenience,
protect fraud, defend crime, or justify wrongs, such as violation of antitrust laws. Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 431 S.W.2d
336, 339 (Tex. 1968).
Much confusion exists in determining the criteria for disregarding the
corporate entity. This confusion exists partially because of the words
used to describe the condition. Courts have used such terms as 'dummy', 'sham', 'instrumentality', 'agency', 'adjunct', 'tool', 'device', and
'business conduit', to name a few. What these words mean relative to
the fact situation of the case is elusive. As Mr. Justice Cardozo, then
Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, observed in Berkey
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926):
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it ....
The problem as delineated by Justice Cardozo is as troublesome today
as then because of the metaphors used by our courts to describe the act
or acts necessary to trigger the application of alter ego. Courts have
generally been less reluctant to disregard the corporate entity in tort
cases than in cases of contract because the injured party in contract
cases had the opportunity to select the entity with whom he contracted;
in a tort case, no such selection is made by a plaintiff. Gentry v. Credit
Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975). Because DalMac's contract with the subsidiary, Hanson Southwest, is the basis of
the claim against the parent, Hanson Development, our further consideration of the alter ego doctrine will be limited to the more stringent
standards applied to contracts. In Bell Oil & Gas Co., at 340, Justice
Norvell quoted from Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporation, 39 Yale L.J. 193, 210-11 (1929), the
following:
The attempt to hold a parent corporation where the claim asserted
is of contractual origin presents added difficulties. The very reasonable question must be met and answered why one contracted
with the subsidiary and received the promise which he bargained
for but who has been disappointed in the fulfillment by the subsidiary of its commitment should then be allowed to look to the
parent. As a matter of contract right it is evident he may not.
Additional compelling facts must appear.
Justice Norvell also observed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to put
these 'additional compelling facts' in the form of a 'laundry list.' Bell
Oil & Gas Co. at 340: See 1 Hildebrand, Texas Corporations§ 5 at 43
(1942). Generally, courts find these 'additional compelling facts' in
cases where the plaintiff has acted to his detriment upon representations made by officers of the parent corporation concerningcontrol and
ownership of the subsidiary and the payment of its debts.8
88. Id. at 716-18.
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Rosenthal v. Leaseway of Texas, Inc. 89 reflects a much more mechanical
approach toward the issue. In a suit involving nonpayment of vehicle lease
rentals the court held an individual shareholder, Rosenthal, personally liable
on the ground that the corporation, Pollution Solutions, Inc. (Pollution) was
an alter ego and a sham corporation. The principal ground for this conclusion was that the articles of incorporation of Pollution had been filed but no
organizing steps had been taken: no bylaws adopted; no directors elected;
no shares of stock issued; no share certificate or share register created; no
meeting of directors or shareholders held; no minute book acquired; no
stated capital paid in; and no financial books and records retained. In
addition, no franchise taxes were paid to the state nor was a federal income
tax return filed. The individual shareholder did, however, serve as president
and received aggregate compensation of some $15,000. Nevertheless, when
all is said and done, Leaseway did deal with Pollution rather than with
Rosenthal individually. The only conceivable justification for the result
reached by the court was that personal liability is a kind of punishment for
failure to follow the formalities and complete the formation of the corporation.
More sensibly reasoned is Joyner v. Alban Group, Inc.9 which was not
analyzed as a piercing the corporate veil case, but did involve an incomplete
or sloppy organization of a corporation. Two issues were involved:
(1) Where a business began transacting business in May 1974 under the
name "Alban Group, Inc.," but the corporation with that name was not
incorporated until November 1974, may the corporation enforce claims
arising from pre-incorporation work? The court's affirmative holding was
based in part on an admission by the defendant that the items had been sold
to it by "Alban Group, Inc." and in part on the notion that "the cause of
action belonged to the Alban Group, Inc." 91 (2) Where the corporation,
Haversack Wine Company, was incorporated in February 1974 and the
plaintiff assumed he was dealing with the corporate president on an individual basis, but made no inquiry whether or not a corporation had been
formed, may the plaintiff hold the president personally liable by naming him
and the corporation as defendants? In holding that the president was not
personally liable the court noted that the use of the word "company" is
sufficient to charge a person with notice that the business may be incorporated. Apparently the corporate president did not represent or hold himself out as being a partnership or proprietorship.
In each of two other cases decided during the survey period, Norton
RefrigeratedExpress, Inc. v. RitterBrothers Co. 92 and L.C.L. Theatres, Inc.
v. Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc. ," a corporate officer and director was
held personally liable, along with the corporation, for fraudulent or tortious
conduct because he participated personally in the wrongful conduct.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

544 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
541 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
Id. at 293.
552 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
421 F. Supp. 1090 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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Finally, in two other cases arising during the survey period, shareholders
were not permitted to ignore the existence of their own corporation when it
suited their own ends. In Adams v. Big Three Industries, Inc. 94 the sole
shareholder, employee, officer, and director of a corporation was not permitted to argue that the corporation was only "a piece of paper" so as to
avoid the then existing rule that only individual plaintiffs could recover
attorney's fees in certain cases. 95 The court argued that since the shareholder "deliberately chose to operate his business as a corporation," it "would
be inequitable now to allow attorney's fees as an individual."96 In Evans v.
Commissioner97 a taxpayer who found it necessary to finance the purchase
of an airplane through a corporation in order to take advantage of the more
liberal usury rules applicable to corporations, lost the right to take personal
deductions for depreciation and losses on resale. There was a substantial
business purpose for the corporation which functioned as such, and under
such circumstances a long line of cases have held the taxpayer is "stuck"
with the corporation. Such a result may usually be avoided simply by the
election of subchapter S treatment; the election was apparently available to
the shareholder here, but for some reason the election was not made.
Pooling Agreements and Share Transfer Restrictions. Two cases during
the survey period raise interesting questions about shareholder pooling
agreements and restrictions on transfer of shares, both of which are basic
components in the close corporation planning arsenal.
R.H. Sanders Corp. v. Haves98 involved the enforceability of a shareholders' agreement that provided: "[elach of the three stockholders shall be a
Director of the corporation and each vote shall be equal. A majority of the
three-man Board of Directors shall control.'' 99 Unfortunately, the agreement did not contain a ten year time limitation, the certificates did not
contain a notation that the shares were subject to a voting agreement, and a
copy of the agreement had not been deposited at the principal office of the
corporation-all apparent requirements for the enforceability of a voting
agreement under article 2.30(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act.'0 °
The court, however, was not concerned with these "technical" provisions.
So far as the time limitation was concerned, the contract was deemed to
incorporate the statutory period, the theory being that, "where the contract
is silent as to time, the parties presumably contracted with the statute in
mind." 101 So far as the notation on certificates and filing the agreement with
the corporation were concerned, their purposes are "to give notice to
shareholders or stock purchasers who are not parties to the voting agree94. 549 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. The provision allowing attorney's fees only to individuals, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 2226 (Vernon 1970), was amended in 1977 to allow attorney's fees to both corporate and
individual plaintiffs. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 233.
96. 549 S.W.2d at 413.
97. 557 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1977).
98. 541 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
99. Id. at 262.
100.

TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30(B) (Vernon Supp. 1978).

101. 541 S.W.2d at 265.
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ment.' 10 2 Here, however, all shareholders were parties and had knowledge
of the agreement so that "no compelling policy reason exists . . .for
"...1,103
requiring technical compliance .
On the basis of pure common sense this decision has much to commend it.
Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with several decisions refusing to uphold
voting trusts for noncompliance with analogous provisions." ° The result,
however, is consistent with some prior Texas case law which upheld similar
agreements without expressly considering article 2.30(B). 115 All in all, one
cannot seriously criticize a case that refuses to invalidate a perfectly reasonable agreement where no one is injured by technical failure to comply
with a rather obscure statute.
The share transfer restriction case, Sammons Enterprises, Inc. v. Manley, 1°6 involved an interesting mechanism for establishing the price at which
shares were to be reacquired by a closely held, highly profitable corporation. Sammons Enterprises issued options to purchase shares to two key
employees in connection with long term employment contracts. The option
price was $320 per share, and each agreement granted the optionee a "put,"
giving him the right to sell the shares back to the corporation at "fair market
value" at any time within twenty years after the exercise of the option.
There was no market for the stock. The key paragraphs of the agreement are
set forth in the court's opinion:
6.02 Determination of, and payment of Put Price, etc. The Put Price
shall be determined by appraisement unless Optionee and the Company
acting through its Board of Directors shall agree on the Put Price. Such
appraisement shall be based on the decision of the majority of three
competent appraisers, two of whom shall be representatives from the
Trust Department of the Republic National Bank of Dallas and the First
National Bank in Dallas, respectively, and the third shall be an appraiser appointed by the other two appraisers. The Put Price as determined
by such appraisement shall be conclusive and binding upon the
Company and Optionee. The Put Price (together with accrued interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of exercise of the Put) shall
be paid by the Company to Optionee within ten (10) days after issuance
by the appraisers of their report setting forth the Put Price. All costs and
expenses of the appraisement shall be borne by the Company.
Section 6.01(b) of the stock option agreement provided the guidelines for
determining the put price as follows:
(b) Put Price. The price which the company shall pay to Optionee
upon the exercise of the Put shall be an amount in cash equal to the
aggregate fair market value of all the shares subject to the Put which
shall be determined as of the last day of the calendar month in which the
Put was exercised in accordance with the principles of valuation established for Federal estate tax purposes in valuing stock of a closely-held
corporation (including those principles set forth in Section 2031(b)
IRC).107
102. Id.
103. /d.
104. See also Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956); Appon v. Belle
Isle Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 122, 46 A.2d 749 (1946).
105. 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 662.
106. 540 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107.

Id. at 754.
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The agreement misfired after the two employees exercised. their options,
paying over 4.8 million dollars for the shares, and then immediately sought
to exercise the put. The parties were unable to agree on a price. The two
banks involved refused to make the appraisal unless the employees agreed
to provisions that would hold the banks harmless, and indemnify them
against possible claims arising from the fact that Sammons Enterprises was
a substantial depositor in both banks, its principal shareholder was a director
of Republic National Bank, and an officer of Republic was a director of
Sammons Enterprises. The employees refused, and matters were stalemated
until the employees filed suit.
The issue of the fair market value of the shares was submitted to a jury,
which valued each at $457. Even though a jury was certainly not the method
of valuation contemplated by the agreement, a judgment based on this figure
was affirmed. The court indicated that the appraisal mechanism was not the
object of the contract "but only incidental to arriving at the fair market
yalue." 108 The court also stated that the doctrine of impossibility might
excuse compliance with the appraisal provision even if it were a condition of
the corporation's obligation. Of course, at the time of the suit, the employees had invested significant sums in the shares in complete reliance on the
enforceability of the put. To leave them remediless under the circumstances
hardly seems fair or just. It further seems hardly fair or just to require them
to waive possible claims against the designated appraisers for an improper
appraisal as a condition to the exercise of the put. Nevertheless, if parties do
not want juries to appraise stock when the designated appraisers fail to do
so, it appears to be essential that an alternative, fail-safe appraisal mechanism be established in the agreement itself.
Employment and Authority of CorporateOfficers. Three cases during the
survey period also raise the perennial question of the inherent authority of
officers under Texas law.1°9 In Plains Builders, Inc. v. Pride Transport
0
Co. I"
a party who was the corporate president, the chief operating officer,
and the principal shareholder executed a non-negotiable promissory note
with the signature "Stanley D. Wardlaw, President-Wardlaw Transport
Express." The corporation sought to avoid payment on the ground of lack
of authority. There was no evidence of approval by the directors, but the
court held the corporation bound because as "Chief operating officer,"
Wardlaw was the equivalent of a "general manager," with broad power to
bind the corporation."'
In Sabine Investment Co. of Texas, Inc. v. Stratton"' an agent for a real
estate firm was found to have implied authority to enter into an executory
contract to sell a lot owned by the firm. The court did not specify whether
the authority was actual or apparent, but relied on evidence that could lead
108. Id. at 756.
109. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 585.
110. 554 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
I11. Id. at 60; see, e.g., Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co. v. Bishop Mfg. Co., 235 S.W. 850 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted). As indicated in my treatise, this is only one of three
possible lines of authority available in Texas. 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 585.
112. 549 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
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to either: business cards for the agent which were supplied by the defendant,
a desk in defendant's offices, the availability of the defendant's plats and
maps, and the like. In this context the court made it clear that it was only
considering a corporation that was engaged in the business of buying and
selling real estate. Ultimately the corporation prevailed on an independent
ground: the contract was not complete and did not satisfy the statute of
frauds.
3
The third case, Templeton v. Nocona Hills Owners Association," indicates that the doctrine of extremely limited authority for corporate presidents in Texas is alive and healthy. The contract involved the employment
of a manager of a country club for one year with a base compensation of
$850 per month. The agreement was executed by the club president but
never approved by its board of directors. The court held the agreement
unenforceable, stating that "the settled rule in Texas is that a corporation
president, merely by virtue of his office, has no inherent power to bind the
corporation 4except as to routine matters arising in the ordinary course of
business." 11
Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson" 5 is a rather peculiar 1960 Texas
Supreme Court opinion relating to employment contracts for corporate
officers. The essence of the holding of that case is that where a bylaw
provides that an officer shall be elected annually, an employment contract to
serve in that office may not exceed one year. 116 In Meredith v. Duval County
Ranch Co. 117 a court refused to expand the principle of PioneerSpecialties.
The contract appointed a person chairman of the board of directors "until
further action of the Board of Directors" and provided for long term
compensation for himself and his wife (in the event his salary was reduced).
The court held that this did not violate public policy as set forth in Pioneer
Specialties since the contract provided for additional duties for the employee other than serving as chairman of the board. The court also concluded
that long-term employment contracts are generally valid and that the
claimed disparity in exchanged considerations was not so unconscionable as
to merit equitable relief." 8
Venue and Jurisdiction. Most cases involving issues of venue and jurisdiction are not particularly survey-worthy, because they involve straightforward application of the venue and long-arm statutes to various fact patterns.
At least one case, however, is of indirect interest to most Texas attorneys.
The United States Supreme Court has struck down the so-called Delaware
sequestration statute which attempted to divert most litigation involving the
113. 555 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
114. Id. at 538.
1l5. 339 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1960).
116. The case is discussed in 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 12, § 591. It would appear that,
whatever the nature of this principle, it should not apply when the board has the power to
amend the bylaws. In that event the directors might amend the bylaws to provide for longer
election periods and it exalts form over substance to require the two-step procedure of
amending and then contracting. An implied amendment of the bylaws raises practical problems
of its own, however, since the written bylaws cannot safely be relied upon.
117. 538 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
118. Id. at 265.
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internal affairs of corporations under Delaware law into the Delaware
courts." 9 The case involves a significant revision of constitutional concepts
of "quasi in rem" jurisdiction.
Ultra Vires Guarantees of Indebtedness. Article XII, section 6 of the
Texas Constitution provides that no corporation shall issue "stock or bonds
except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received."' 2 ° The
precise scope of this article and its potential application to corporate guarantees of indebtedness has always been uncertain. During the survey period
the Fifth Circuit rejected an argument put forward in a bankruptcy case that
a corporation's written guarantee of the indebtedness of another constituted
a stock or bond and, therefore, was unenforceable as a violation of article
XII, section 6.121 The court relied primarily on the historical evil against
which section 6 was directed-watered stock. It also pointed out, however,
the broad consequences of accepting the constitutional argument, which
would make impossible the assumption of an obligation for future benefits
and would invalidate a Texas statute permitting corporate guarantees of
indebtedness that had been amended two times during the 1970's.122
De facto Mergers. In Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt'23
the court adopted the concept of a de facto merger to hold Western Resources Life Insurance Company (WR Life) liable for tort obligations,
including exemplary damages, incurred by American Business and Commercial Life Insurance Company (ABC). WR Life had acquired the assets of
ABC in exchange for shares of WR Corporation, apparently either the
parent of WR Life or a close affiliate. ABC distributed the shares to its
shareholders and then dissolved. The agreement stated that WR Life was
not assuming contingent liabilities of ABC, including presumably the fraud
claims of the plaintiffs. The board of directors of WR Life was increased,
however, from nine to fifteen, with the six new directors being designated
by ABC, so that considerable continuity existed.
In a brief opinion the court held "that an overview of the entire transaction has convinced us that the effect was a merger of the two corporations.' 24 While the court stressed the continuation of the business, it also
relied "upon the notion that no corporation should be permitted to commit a
tort and avoid liability through corporate transformations or changes in form
only.' 1 25 Finally, it distinguished between transactions in which the purchasing corporation paid for assets with stock, which is usually considered a
119. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). See Jacobs & Stargatt, The

New Delaware Director-Consent-to-Service Statute, 33 Bus. LAw. 701 (1978) (discussion of
Delaware's response to Shaffer v. Heitner).
120. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
121. H.J. Cohn Furniture (No. 2) Co. v. Texas W. Furniture Corp., 544 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.

1977).
122. The statute referred to, of course, is TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06B

(Vernon Supp. 1978), relating to corporate guarantees. This statute was amended in 1973 and
1977. Id.
123. 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, application for writ pending).
124. Id. at 786.
125. Id.
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de facto merger, and transactions in which the assets are paid for with cash,
which is generally considered to be a bona fide sale of assets without tort
liability following the purchasing corporation.126 A writ of error is pending.
While the opinion seems to oversimplify a complex area and to assume pat
answers based on simple criteria, the conclusion seems reasonable on the
specific facts.
Securities Regulation. At the federal level, the survey period has seen
further attempts by the United States Supreme Court to narrow and restrict
the role of the federal courts. In TSCIndustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. ,127
for example, the Court narrowed the test of materiality in determining
whether misstatements or omissions in proxy statements may be used to
attack a transaction approved as a result of the proxy solicitation. The Court
stated that a material fact was one that a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding how to vote. Earlier case law, particularly
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Corp. ,128 had somewhat ambiguously indicated
that the test should be whether such a shareholder might consider the fact
important.
Other significant cases included: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 holding
that scienter is an essential element of private causes of action under rule
lOb-5; Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc. ,13o holding that a defeated cash
tender offeror does not have standing to bring a private damage suit under
the so-called Williams Act; and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,"' refusing to permit rule lOb-5 to be used to attack an allegedly unfair "going
private" transaction. These cases were decided so recently that their full
implications are still uncertain. The lower and state courts are beginning to
struggle with these cases with divergent results. In Dupuy v. Dupuy,'3 2 for
example, the Fifth Circuit considered the effect of the Hochfelder scienter
requirement on the issue of the standard of care required of the plaintiff.
The court concluded that the test should not be whether the plaintiff acted
"unreasonably," but whether he intentionally refused to investigate in light
of a known risk or a risk so obvious that he must have been aware of it. Mr.
Justice White of the United States Supreme Court dissented from the denial
of certiorari in this case,133 arguing that the disagreement among the circuits
on this issue required Supreme Court action: "Business can be transacted
more freely and efficiently if the responsibility for verifying facts is clearly
allocated. 14
In another interesting development, the Supreme Court of Delaware has
indicated that it will broaden Delaware law to fill the gap left by the United
States Supreme Court in Santa Fe. In Singer v. Magnovox Co. 135 the court
126.
127.
128,
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 787.
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312, 54 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1977).
98 S. Ct. 312, 54 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1977).
Id.at 313, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 198.
367 A.2d 1349 (Del. 1977).
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held that a short form merger must have not only a valid business purpose
but also must meet the test of "entire fairness." Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc. 136 concluded that a legitimate business purpose
existed when the principal reason for the cash merger, eliminating the
minority interest, was a desire to facilitate long term debt financing by the
parent corporation. Of course, the test of "entire fairness" would also have
to be met. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 137 saw the Delaware Supreme
Court employ a standard of full disclosure in a cash tender offer, as a matter
of state law, that appears to rival the approach taken by lower federal courts
under the federal securities laws prior to Chris-Craft. While it is possible
that the Delaware corporate bar will choke off the rather expansionist views
of the Delaware Supreme Court by legislative amendment, the development
may reflect a wholesome, permanent restoration of the balance between the
federal and state jurisdiction in the corporation law area.
136. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
137. 351 A.2d 570 (Del. 1976).

